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Abstract 
This paper develops a wave theory of political contestation, and places the 
current economic and political turmoil in a historical perspective. Based on 
legitimacy, it serves as an alternative to the waves of democratization of 
Samuel Huntington (1991). The theoretical framework is based on two main 
theories: the theory of long waves in political economics and the theory about 
state-legitimacy and fiscal crisis. In the first section, this paper gives a short 
overview of the different economic dynamics which over time have been in-
corporated in long wave theories, predominantly based on the works of Kon-
dratieff (1979) and Schumpeter (1939), and puts the current economic situa-
tion in this perspective. The second part analyzes the general interdependen-
cy between long waves and politics, and the original criticisms of the endog-
enous model by Trotsky (1923). The third section considers long waves theo-
ries in politics, in particular Samuel Huntington's theory, and discusses the 
main criticisms of his theory. The fourth section analyzes the influence of 
the long wave upswing and downturn on state-legitimacy, and is based on the 
work of O'Connor (2001) and Habermas (1975). The fifth section combines 
the long wave's concept with legitimacy and protest against a long wave the-
ory of political contestation and gives the first elements of some empirical 
evidence, comparing the political contestation in the thirties and today. 
The sixth section draws conclusions and takes a look on the need for further 
research. 
Keywords: crisis, long-wave theory, waves of contestation, Kondratieff, Ha-
bermas, Huntington. 
Introduction 
The combination between democracy and capitalism is by definition an inher-
ently unstable form of organization of a society (Marx 1852; Przeworski and 
Limongi 1993). The recent economic crisis and the recent political upheaval in 
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both the Arab world and the core of the capitalist world system have resurrect-
ed that idea. The systemic character of the Great Recession also brought back 
some attention to the concept of long waves in economics. This paper is an at-
tempt to bring these elements together and build a theoretical framework 
around the unstable combination of capitalist economy and its political super-
structure. 
The theoretical framework is based on two main theories: the theory of 
long waves in the evolution of capitalist development and the theory of the cri-
sis of legitimacy linked to the economic crisis, which was originally conceived 
for understanding the interplay with normal business cycles. The long waves 
serve as a framework to explain long-term instability of the capitalist economy, 
the legitimacy-theory as a framework to understand the transfer mechanism 
between that instability and the political contestation movements. 
The mainstream theory that comes closest to the approach of this kind is 
the theory of waves of democratization by Samuel Huntington (1991). Howev-
er, there are conceptual and methodological problems with this approach. 
The theoretical framework developed in this paper also tries to answer these 
shortcomings basing this alternative theory on legitimation and contestation. 
The first section of this paper gives a general overview of the different 
economic dynamics which over time have been incorporated in long wave theo-
ry in an attempt to explain the instability of the historical development of capi-
talism, and puts the current economic situation in this perspective. The second 
section starts from the criticism on the endogenous character of many long cy-
cle theories and opens its interactive relation with politics. The third section 
takes a look into long cycle's theories, in particular the ‘third wave’ of Hunting-
ton and addresses its shortcomings. The fourth section brings in the interplay of 
upswing and downturn of the long wave with the theory of legitimation crisis 
by Habermas and the fiscal crisis by O'Connor. The fifth section draws a long 
wave theory of political contestation and tries to find first empirical evidence. 
The sixth section draws conclusions and takes a look on the need for further 
research. 
Introduction to Long Waves in World Economics 
This article is written from the perspective that a long wave approach is crucial 
to understand current political developments, not in a deterministic sense, but 
as a perspective of society which allows to interconnect different long-term 
developments within the capitalist system with other dimensions of society. 
This paper does not attempt to give a full overview of all theories treating  
K-waves, but merely draws some examples, in order to show the relevancy 
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these long waves can have for the creation and reproduction of institutions in 
a capitalist society, in particular democracy. 
Historically, before the development of the capitalist world system, periods 
of economic crisis and scarcity were primarily linked with temporal scarcities 
of vital elements for the reproduction of those socioeconomic systems. In clas-
sic economic terms, we could call them scarcities of production factors others 
than capital. Shortages of labor, human beings, following human disasters such 
as wars and diseases, and of raw materials/land, natural resources, following 
natural disasters such as draughts, earthquakes and floods were the basis of 
economic crisis situations. Shortages of capital usually did not cause crisis situ-
ations, because it played no vital role in the reproduction of societies. 
This only changes slowly with the ascendance of capitalism, as the capital 
becomes a vital element in the organization of society, and the capital accumu-
lation process becomes central to the reproduction of the existing society. 
The idea of K-waves already has existed since early patterns of different paces 
of capitalist development came to appear. The price level, on which Kondratieff 
based his waves, in the earliest stages of capitalism, however, was determined 
much more by agricultural and raw material prices than by industrial prices, 
thus having a determinant effect on long wave patterns. Only after 1940 did the 
increasing weight of industry in total world production in the primary and sec-
ondary sectors put an end to the downward trend in the price level during peri-
ods of basic sector surplus (Van Duijn 1982, cited by Vayrynen 1983).  
As the most renown pioneer of long wave patterns in the capitalist world 
system, Kondratieff was hardly the first observing these long wave patterns 
(Van Duijn 1982). Inspired by the work of Jacob van Gelderen (1913), he based 
his 1926 work The Long Waves in Economic Life (Kondratieff 1979) on empir-
ical observations of long waves in world economics, based on price fluctuations 
(Delbeke 1981). Since Kondratieff, other authors have found similar wave pat-
terns in growth and investments and different theories have emerged to explain 
them and to analyze their interaction with different elements of human behavior 
and evolutions of society. 
Generally, long-wave theories can be divided into exogenous and endoge-
nous models. Exogenous models explain the economic waves on the basis of 
causal factors that are essentially exogenous to the economic cycle, in particu-
lar phenomena such as major wars, discoveries of new markets and new 
sources of raw materials. 
Endogenous models explain them through the factors that are totally en-
dogenous to the capital accumulation process itself; that is to say their availa-
bility of capital, and the manner, the technology how it is applied. These per-
spectives imply that an economic upswing contains seeds of its own destruc-
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tion, while every downturn gives rise, automatically, to remedial action that 
leads to a new upswing (Vayrynen 1983). 
Kondratieff himself emphasized the discontinuity in the production and du-
ration of long-term fixed capital as the most powerful driving force of the long 
wave (Delbeke 1981). Three elements would produce those wave-like patterns: 
short term supply and demand, the expansion and contraction of volumes of 
production on the base of existing capital equipment, and changes in capital 
stock (Day 1976). Kondratieff's starting point originated probably in Karl 
Marx's conjuncture theory (Delbeke 1981), applying them on a longer time-
frame. Marx's theory, explained in Capital (Volume 3), observed business cy-
cles, repeating themselves each decade, based on the material wearing out, re-
placement and expansion of the mass of means of production in the form of 
machines lasting an average of ten years (Day 1976). As the waves Kondratieff 
observed in price statistics were much longer than that of Marx's decade-long 
business cycles based on the wearing out of machinery, Kondratieff related 
them in a very comparable mechanism to the reproduction of the most durable 
and costly forms of fixed capital, such as canals, railways, buildings and  
the periodical technological renovations of industry which attend the rising 
wave of a long cycle, which would have a wearing-out time of around fifty 
years (Day 1976). 
The implication is that the long cycle is, as much as the normal business 
cycle, a consequence of the internal dynamics of capitalism itself. Within these 
cycles Kondratieff distinguished four phases: prosperity, recession, depression, 
recovery1 (Kondratieff cited by Delbeke 1981), linked to four phases of capital 
accumulation: accelerated capital accumulation, overaccumulation, decelerated 
accumulation, underinvestment (Mandel 1976; Delbeke 1981), which have 
a profound impact on the organization of society. A rising wave presupposes 
a lengthy period of savings concentrated in the hands of investors and profit 
opportunities sufficiently attractive to start a new wave of durable investment. 
This fact thus also implies reduced consumption and lower growth in the period 
before the upswing and requires institutions able to reproduce social inequali-
ties and to legitimize them. Over time, the rising wave will cause the interest 
rate to rise, as available capital becomes scarce, and investment and consump-
tion would then be curtailed, causing the upswing motor of investment and con-
sumption to sputter and transforming into a declining wave (Day 1976). In the 
depression phase, the capital is unable to find enough productive opportunities 
for investment, causing a devaluation of capital (Mandel 1976; cited by 
Delbeke 1981: 251). This is followed again by higher rates of savings and the 
                                                          
1 Interestingly, Kondratieff linked the long wave with gold production.   
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discovery of cost-cutting innovations (Day 1976), which enables the process to 
restart. 
Others, such as Schumpeter (1939), emphasized the importance of clusters 
of innovation and technological changes as the base for the long waves.  
The disappearance of profit and together with the change from monopolistic to 
competitive markets would be the turning point of long waves, which would 
lead to the periods of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1976: 81–86), eliminat-
ing the inefficient sectors of the economy during the depression phase. At this 
stage, the economy will be dominated by cost-cutting rationalizing manage-
ment. This contrasts with the start of a new wave which is characterized by 
entrepreneurship, instead of management, and stimulates innovative action and 
technological renewal (Delbeke 1981). Organizational, managerial and social 
changes play a major role as preconditions for the emergence and spread of 
technological innovations (Schumpeter 1939; Vayrynen 1983). Mensch (1979) 
gave Schumpeter's technology-driven theory an empirical base. Incorporation 
of new industrial sectors and new markets in the capitalist system were crucial 
during the upswings of 1825, 1886, 1935. The effect on longtime growth of the 
economy as a consequence of these technological revolutions would however 
be limited in time. Growing saturation of the new markets, leads to the need of 
export of surpluses and provokes competition between countries, which even-
tually leads to the complete saturation of demand of the world economy's lead-
ing sectors. The only fundamental solution would be a renewal of the economy, 
through a new aggressive innovation policy (Delbeke 1981). This means that 
within the endogenous model ‘innovations do not happen, they are made to 
happen’ (Ibid.), but also that radically different innovative ideas generally must 
wait for next upswing (Forrester in Delbeke 1981). On the basis of the observa-
tions, it may be concluded that innovation life cycles, infrastructural invest-
ments, the dynamics of new industrial branches and the long waves of econom-
ic development are associated with one another (Van Duijn 1982: 129–144 in 
Vayrynen 1983). Each Kondratieff upturn can be linked to a set of technologi-
cal innovations such as railroads or the automobile suburban complex [Block 
1981; Harvey 2010]). 
Although the role of capital has gained predominance for explaining wave-
patterns, I want to emphasize that, in my opinion, this can never be seen apart 
from the rest of the organization of society, which explains why long waves in 
economics can never be interpreted in a deterministic sense. Other production 
factors, for example, have a dialectical relation with the capital accumulation 
process; and thus with K-waves. Labor and land, for example, stay heavily at-
tached to the patterns of development within the capitalist world economy. Ac-
cording to Rostow (1978 in Delbeke 1981), for example, long waves provoke 
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changes in the profitability of producing food and raw materials; growing popu-
lation and rising real income during the upswing create an increasing pressure 
on the supply of food. In the same way, developing industrialization creates 
a pressure on the available supply of raw materials (Delbeke 1981: 9–10). (Fur-
ther reading Jason Moore.)  
Within the labor market, competitive pressures within industry become 
stronger during the downturn. Labour-saving and material-saving technical 
changes become increasingly important for competitiveness of production. This 
leads to the growth of capital intensity of production (Freeman 1979; cited by 
Delbeke 1981). The interdependence between labor market, technology and 
capital intensity make it very difficult to distinguish unemployment as a result 
of production innovation from unemployment because of saturation of demand 
(Delbeke 1981), but from a non-deterministic perspective on long waves in 
capitalism, they can be both part of the same mechanism. 
The same is true for the superstructure of capitalist society and its institu-
tions. Long term developments of capitalism have formed, reformed and de-
formed the institutions of reproduction of the capitalist society. This is also the 
case for democracy, as an institution for governing political relations between 
citizens and the capitalist state. Today's political turmoil and the declining legit-
imacy of existing democratic institutions as a consequence of the economic 
depression and its interaction with long waves is the object of study of this  
paper. 
RELATIONS WITH POLITICS 
Kondratieff's initial endogenous theory has been criticized by Trotsky (1923) 
from the beginning, using a dialectic materialist perspective on the relation be-
tween economics and society in contrast to Kondratieff. His main critique was 
that Kondratieff's model was too schematic and deterministic. He emphasized 
the importance of the dialectical relationship between economics and politics. 
Although he recognized the existence of patterns of long periods of capitalist 
development, he emphasized the influence of elements which were the part of 
the political superstructure of the capitalist society. These made the turning 
points of Kondratieff's wave rather unpredictable, which made Trotsky con-
clude that their periodicity had never been fixed (Trotsky 1923). ‘Significant 
external factors of this superstructural order or external conditions, are wars 
and revolutions, which determine the character and alteration of expansive, 
stagnating or declining epochs of capitalist development’ (Ibid.: 9; also cited by 
Day 1976; Vayrynen 1983).  
Polemicizing with Kondratieff, Trotsky stated that long cycles did not 
‘grow out of the internal dynamics of the capitalist process as such, but out of 
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the conditions in which [the accumulation process] finds itself ... out of the 
opening up of new continents, colonies and markets for capitalist activity, or 
out of the military and revolutionary shocks which cross its path’ (Trotsky 
1923; Day 1976: 78). Superstructural events hinder the free or semi-free inter-
play of economic forces. Trotsky sought to demonstrate that ‘external condi-
tions’ and the relative autonomy of ‘superstructural’ phenomena precluded any 
automatic periodicity of long cycles (Day 1976). Moreover, he saw the eco-
nomic process as such too complex and statistics too limited to have a deter-
ministic positivist economic model (Trotsky 1923). The logical consequence 
was that Trotsky denied the existence of long cycles and referred instead to 
distinct ‘epochs’, or historical ‘periods’, (Day 1976) which also showed pat-
terns of economic growth and decline, for which the economy in the last analy-
sis nevertheless stayed crucial, but were less deterministic and more open to 
influence from the superstructure. Governments are thus not totally at the mer-
cy of the long-term developments of K-wave (Vayrynen 1983). 
In his original critique, Trotsky (1923) identifies two political events that 
would have influence on long waves and their turning points: wars and revolu-
tions. Basically these are two systems interrupting events on two apparently 
different domains: national politics and international politics. These are also the 
two different arenas where contradictions of the system of production express 
themselves in the form of a legitimation crisis, as Habermas (1975) analyzed, 
on the national level and will be developed further on in this paper. As is the 
case with the legitimation crisis of the system on the national level, imperialism 
and (neo)colonialism are a transfer mechanism for externalizing the internal 
contradictions between Labor and Capital, resulting in a social redistribution of 
power and wealth and a reconfiguration of power relations. What is expressed 
on the national level as a fiscal crisis or a crisis of overproduction, can culmi-
nate in major wars between major countries (Van Duijn 1982). These crises 
themselves can have a major effect on capital accumulation processes, by re-
moving or erecting barriers to the accumulation process, and thus have effects 
on the long term development of capitalism and its long waves. Wars and revo-
lutions often condition industrial change, but they are not its prime movers 
(Schumpeter 1976: 82). Both are determined, but only in last instance, by eco-
nomic conditions, as they both are the consequence of changing power relations 
and changes in legitimacy of those relations. 
Most studies about the interaction between long waves and politics have 
been conducted on the level of international relations. States are, for example, 
within certain limits, ‘able to steer and restructure the reality, including engag-
ing in military confrontations among themselves’ (Vayrynen 1983: 402).  
The U.S. case, for example, shows the possibility that ‘participation in a major 
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war outside one's territory may prolong the upswing preceding war by stimulat-
ing the economy’ (Van Duijn 1982: 6; Vayrynen 1983: 408). But an economic 
crisis also does always lead to political and military confrontations. If the crisis 
is deep enough, however, as it was between the two world wars, such confron-
tations cannot be avoided. The best way to analyze the effect of long wave is 
thus to start from ‘a mutually inter-dependent historical process’ (Vayrynen 
1983: 407) as major wars bring about economic consequences that alter the 
course of the economic cycle from what it would otherwise have been (Ibid.). 
A similar point of view should be taken into account for the national social 
and economic policy, with the existence of a margin for governments to tempo-
rarily escape the effects of economic crisis through policy-measures, and by 
this temporarily overcome the contradictions of the capitalist system that pro-
voked the downturn. This could explain how the crisis of the nineteen seventies 
could have been postponed by neoliberal reforms, the liberalization of financial 
markets and the reincorporation of the markets of Eastern Europe into the 
world market. 
The above discussion illustrates why this paper does not speak out on the en-
dogenous or exogenous character of long wave patterns. For the same reason, this 
paper uses the term ‘long wave’, as does Van Duijn (1982: 1), and not a ‘long 
cycle’. ‘The distinction between “wave” and “cycle” is important, as the term 
“cycle” suggests a model, in which fluctuations are generated as an endogenous 
process; with fixed periodicity and amplitude’ (Ibid.). 
LONG POLITICAL CYCLES THEORIES 
Most of the research done on the mutual influence of economic cycle patterns 
and politics are focused on the influence of elections on macro-economic poli-
cy, concentrating on the macro-economic effects of electoral cycles, the so-
called political business cycles (Tufte 1980; Willett 1988; Nordhaus 1975).  
The rest of this paper, however, will discuss theories that focus on the reverse 
relation: the influence of economic wave-patters, in particular long waves, on 
the political sphere. 
While Vayrynen (1983) and others also have studied the influence of long 
waves on international relations, this article concentrates on the political legiti-
macy of national institutions, assuming that political decision-making is affect-
ed by the economic evolution. The margins of decision-making are smaller 
during the periods of stagnation and negative growth. Hence constraints on 
government action are greater during long economic downturns. Those periods 
are usually associated with nationalism and conservatism while the upswing 
phase gives rise to liberalism and reformism (Ibid.). Wave-like patterns of po-
litical developments, based on economic cycles can be found in the work of 
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Eric Hobsbawm (1994). The most influential general theory, however, is that of 
Huntington (1991) (see Green 1999; Doorenspleet 2000; Fraser 2001).  
In The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Samu-
el Huntington (1991) elaborated a theory of ‘waves of democracy’ – believing 
that democratic institutions ‘emerged in waves of democratization’, observing 
three of those waves: the first one of 1828–1926 with the democratization of 
Europe, the second one between 1943 and 1962 in the period of the defeat 
of Nazi-Germany and the decolonization, and the third one, the democratization 
in Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe of 1974–1990. Between 
the three waves were reverse waves, these periods being 1922–1942 and 1958–
1975 (Fraser 2001; Doorenspleet 2000). 
Huntington (1991) defines waves of democratization as ‘groups of transi-
tions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified 
period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite di-
rection during that period of time’ (Huntington 1991: 15; cited by Fraser 2001: 
53), also involving liberalization or partial democratization in political systems 
that do not become fully democratic. Reverse waves are periods in which ‘some 
but not all of the countries that had previously made the transition to democra-
cy, reverted to nondemocratic rule’ (Huntington 1991: 13–16; cited by Fraser 
2001: 41). 
According to Huntington (1991) two factors might cause prolonged eco-
nomic growth to give rise to a wave of democratization. The first one would 
raise the growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and create the 
economic possibility to ‘afford’ democratic governance. The second one, rapid 
economic growth, would give rise to political tensions and movements that 
disrupt and challenge the prevailing political order from which democratic gov-
ernance may emerge (Fraser 2001).  
Huntington's approach is an exogenous approach to democratization, as it 
assumes that ‘democracies are equally likely to emerge at any level, that is, 
even if development under authoritarianism does not increase the probability 
that a country will become democratic’ (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 181), 
and the reason why more developed countries have a higher chance to be dem-
ocratic is because once they are democratic they are more likely to stay demo-
cratic. The exogenous approach concentrates on external influences, such as 
wars, leading to exogenous transitions (Fraser 2001; Green 1999). World War I 
and the Russian Revolution, for example, played an important role in the estab-
lishment of universal suffrage in Europe (Fraser 2001; Green 1999). World 
War II and the destruction of Nazi-Germany played an important role in the 
second wave of democratization and the collapse of the Soviet Union could be 
seen as an external factor in Huntington's Third Wave of democratization 
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(1991). Nonetheless, the important role of external pressures for democratiza-
tion does not contradict with the existence of wave-like developments, as we 
have seen that events as wars and revolutions are closely linked with them. 
The endogenous approach, on the other hand, assumes democracy as the 
result of development itself, implying that ‘if other countries become as rich as 
the economically advanced nations, it is highly probable that they will become 
political democracies’ (Lipset 1959; cited by Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 
175). This is essentially a modernization theory of democratization, assumes 
that some level of economic development is a prerequisite for democracy  
(Przeworski and Limongi 1993) and originated in the comparative study of 
Seymour Lipset (1959). It supposes that ‘modernization consists of a gradual 
differentiation and specialization of social structures that… consist of sequenc-
es of industrialization, urbanization, education, communication, mobilization, 
and political incorporation, among innumerable others: a progressive accumula-
tion of social changes that prepare a society to proceed its culmination, democ-
ratization’ (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Habermas (1975) adopts it in the 
next section ‘Legitimation crisis’ when he states that the increasing complexity 
of the economy and organization of society destroys barriers of participation 
and contradicts the top-down structure of authoritarian decision-making. 
Although the debate between endogenous and exogenous models of de-
mocratization has been fierce, the holistic approach which this paper adopts, 
making no distinction between endogenous and exogenous models for long 
waves makes the difference between both models of democratization – or better 
periods of political contestation, as we will address further in this paper – point-
less, as exogenous factors such as wars and revolutions can be brought into the 
model through the effect of long waves. In this sense, the only thing that mat-
ters is that a correlation between long waves and the democratization processes, 
be it endogenous or exogenous, appears to be proven in empirical studies (Fra-
ser 2001). 
Other criticisms on Huntington's theory (1991) are more relevant for this 
paper. The first is the problem that democratization and reversal, revolutions 
and counterrevolution, usually occur at the same moment. The Russian Revo-
lution provoked on the wave of democratizations in Western Europe after 
WWI, but at the same time harsh counteractions happened (Green 1999). Alt-
hough Huntington (1991) saw capitalist growth as a democratizing factor, 
Polanyi (1944) defends that popular democracy and social protectionism also 
were seen as threads to free markets and entrepreneurship by the economic 
elite, whose governments during the 1918 wave sought fascist help to restore 
law and order. 
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The second criticism is conceptual. Huntington's definition (1991) of de-
mocracy is based on Dahl (1971 cited by Doorenspleet 2000: 385) and incorpo-
rates three requirements: competition, inclusiveness and civil liberties. In prac-
tice he focuses only on competition, ignoring even the requirement of universal 
suffrage: voting rights for women, for example, do not play a role in Hunting-
ton's analysis (Doorenspleet 2000). Doorenspleet (2000) tries to answer these 
problems with a more inclusive definition and an adaptation of Huntington's 
countries-model. However, even this formal definition of Democracy remains 
very fragile. Although during the 1990s the number of democratic countries, 
according to her definition, would have been known as a peak, for example, the 
success of neoliberalism and the consequent reduction of the public sphere re-
duced the competences of voters. Or as Graeber (2011: 383) states that since 
Thatcher and Reagan, ‘everyone could now have political rights, but political 
rights were to become economically meaningless’. The number of democracies 
in the procedural definition may thus have been augmented, the number of de-
mocracies in the substantive definition2 probably not; decreasing party-
memberships, decreasing participation in elections and the rise of anti-
democratic parties in Europe since the beginning of the nineties reflect this 
trend. 
LONG CYCLES AND LEGITIMACY 
Keeping the previous criticisms on Huntington (1991) in mind, this paper con-
centrates on the relationship between long waves and legitimacy / political con-
testation of existing institutions instead of their immediate relation with democ-
racy. The concept of legitimacy, and particularly the sociological approach to 
legitimacy, enables us to avoid arbitrary definitions of democracy; which are 
themselves a product of dominating norms and ideology. Moreover, a stronger 
relationship between long waves and political contestation should be expected, 
as political (output-) legitimacy3 of relationship forms the logical link between 
economics and the political superstructure. 
Economic growth can provoke democratization, as Huntington (1991) and 
Doorenspleet (2000) propose, and recession could provoke a reverse cycle, but 
this is not necessary the case, it can even have the adverse effect. Growth can 
serve, and has historically served, as Przeworski (2000) showed, for providing 
                                                          
2 Measuring them as regimes viewed by them as being a representative of the general will or com-
mon good, although the measurement is problematic (Schumpeter 1976). 
3 As I am primarily interested in the relation between the economic developments and political 
legitimacy, this paper will primarily focus on output-legitimacy. For a further discussion about 
input and output legitimacy relating to financial crisis situations, see my paper ‘A Sequential 
Theory of Legitimacy Loss’, written for the seminar of Democratic Theory, PhD Course Democ-
racy for the XXI century (Van Vossole 2012). 
Jonas Van Vossole 287 
authoritarian regimes with the means to legitimize themselves, with contempo-
rary China as an excellent example. Recession, on the other hand, can lead to 
claims for more equal redistribution of wealth and power, and thus for a more 
democratic society, as shown in the Arab Spring and the occupy movement in 
the recent period. Both up- and downturns of the long wave entail periods of 
withdrawal of legitimacy of the political system, and will provoke political con-
testation. 
The upswing and legitimacy 
The theory of the relation between strong economic growth and the evolution 
of political legitimacy, this paper uses, can be brought back to the factors influ-
encing democratization Huntington (1991) addressed. Rapid and differential 
growth, as a consequence of the development of new sectors and technologies, 
would give rise to political tensions and movements that disrupt the prevailing 
political order. Growth would generate the political forces that could challenge 
the prevailing order and refuse to accept the legitimacy of existing power struc-
tures, when they are not adapted to new power relations (Fraser 2001). This is 
what Ronaldo Munck calls ‘Marx-type of unrest’. It is based on Marx' historical 
materialist idea that economic development leads to new (class) forces with 
new interests and the creation of a new power struggle. The development of 
merchant capitalism, for example, created the first bourgeois classes, which 
contested the feudal institutions, and the process of early industrialization cre-
ated a rising working class which contested the minimal democracy and the 
existing inequalities. These conflicts, and thus the contestation of the existing 
institutional order, originate in the basic contradictions between productive 
forces and social and political forms. 
This explains why a new investment wave ultimately contributes to politi-
cal and social instability (Day 1976). Examples of this kind of contestation are 
the feminist movement, consequence of the incorporation of women in the la-
bor-market, which nearly doubled the labor supply needed for the reconstruc-
tion and boom of capitalism during and after the Second World War. The same 
holds for the American civil rights movement and decolonialization move-
ments. 
This destabilization through growth, with its higher probability of delegit-
imation of public policies, however, does not mean that democratic institutions 
are endangered themselves. Empirical data show that faster growing democra-
cies survive longer than others (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 167). As growth 
means there is a ‘bigger pie’ to be divided, wealth during the upswing creates 
a broader margin for policy-making and engages in compromises, making sys-
tems be able to afford democracy (Huntington 1991). 
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Rising political contestation during periods of upturn can thus be expected, 
but they are more likely to lead to reform of the existing policy structures than 
their overthrow. It should be noted, that according to Huntington, possible de-
mocratization during the upturn would threaten further growth. In his view 
‘democracy generates an explosion of demands for current consumption. These 
demands, in turn, threaten profits; hence they reduce investment and retard 
growth’ (Huntington 2006; Przeworski and Limongi 1993), and thus lay the 
seeds for a new downturn.  
The downturn and legitimacy 
Despite the near trivial relation between legitimacy and economic crisis, only 
relatively few social scientists have analyzed the subject (Block 1981). In-
stead, most of the literature is based on the relation between democratic legit-
imacy and the degree of economic development, going back to the study of 
Lipset (1959) on the social requisites of democracy (Przeworski and Limongi 
1997). Block attributes this to two factors: an excessive belief in economic 
growth, which was only strengthened in the last decades of neoliberalism, and 
the academic division of labor which separated economics and the other so-
cial sciences. 
Economic crisis nevertheless represents one of the most common threats to 
stability (Diamond and Linz 1989; Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 169). Politi-
cal systems have a high probability of transition and institutional change, when 
confronted with negative growth. This is the case for democracies as well as for 
autocracies. Empirical research by Przeworski shows that when democracies 
face a decline in incomes, they die at the rate of 0.0523 and can be expected to 
last for nineteen years. Authoritarian regimes die at a rate of 0.0261 and are 
expected to last for thirty-eight years. They are thus much less stable than in 
years of growth, with two rates of 0.0160 and 62 years in democracies, and 
0.017 and 58 years in autocracies (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 168). These 
effects of a crisis manifest themselves immediately. One year of an economic 
crisis is enough to produce political effects; growth in the recent past does not 
make any difference (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). 
The theoretical relation between the downturn of economic cycles and po-
litical legitimacy in this paper is inspired by the transfer mechanisms theorized 
by Habermas (1975). Although Habermas bases his theory of legitimation crisis 
on the mechanism of short, decade-long (Juglar) business cycles, his observa-
tions are worth considering for long cycles.4 According to Habermas (1975), 
crisis tendencies shift from the economic into the administrative system 
through the transfer mechanism of government intervention. Government inter-
                                                          
4 Habermas based his theory on the same cycle that served as inspiration for Kondratieff. 
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vention is required to protect5 citizens from an immediate transformation of the 
contradictions within the capitalist economy into a social crisis, causing mass 
unemployment, poverty, hunger and violence (Block 1981). 
With this immunization, economic crisis, however, has been transferred to 
another level, meaning that crisis can be reflected in disparate wage develop-
ments, permanent inflation and corresponding uneven redistribution of income, 
disproportional sectorial and geographical developments, and a permanent fis-
cal crisis as ‘the economic crisis is intercepted and transformed into a systemat-
ic overloading of the public budget’ (Habermas 1975: 69). Ultimately crisis 
management is the re-coupling of the economic system to the political system. 
Economic processes, power-relations, class-relations and social distributions of 
wealth, which had been de-politicized and obscured by the market mechanism, 
by Habermas (1975: 36) designated as an ‘ideology of fair exchange’, are re-
politicized and visualized suddenly. They are not anymore divine ‘natural 
laws’, but the part of a political choice (Ibid.). 
Due to the re-politicization of the allocation of wealth, policy-makers are 
confronted with a dilemma. Policy-makers have the political choice between 
passing the social cost of the downturn to the majority of the population, by 
cutting back on public goods and services, and raising taxes beyond the levels 
that are seen to be fair, and thus risk to reduce its output-legitimacy, or they can 
undermine the accumulation process of the economic elite by reducing services 
needed to capital for its reproduction or ‘by raising additional revenues in  
an inflationary manner’ (O'Connor 2001 cited by Block 1981).6 
The consequence of the first option is public poverty, impoverishment of 
public transportation, education, housing and health care (Habermas 1975).  
The concern with personal happiness that characterizes the consumer society, 
which has come ‘increasingly to rest its claim for legitimacy on its capacity to 
assure continuous economic growth to provide a range of services to the popu-
lation without raising taxation to a level perceived as oppressive’, comes into 
conflict with the need for discipline in a period of slow growth (Block 1981: 2). 
The end of continually rising living in developed capitalist societies, dramati-
cally undermines the legitimacy of modern states in capitalist societies, (Ha-
bermas 1975; O'Connor 2001 cited by Block 1981) and as governments lag 
behind what people expect from them, the ‘penalty for this failure is withdrawal 
                                                          
5 According to Polanyi, this ability for protection against the ‘self-regulating market’ is the legiti-
mation of the state. 
6 The recent austerity measures can be put in the first category, QE2 can be put in the second. It 
should be noted, however, that QE and monetary expansion of the ECB primarily affect financial 
capital, and much less industrial capital. This financial capital, particularly in the USA, is in the 
hands of foreign investors. 
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of legitimation’ (Habermas 1975: 46) meaning that ‘the system does not suc-
ceed in maintaining the requisite level of mass loyalty’ (Ibid.: 69). 
Political legitimation should compensate for the loss of economic (output-) 
legitimacy of the market, as it cannot rely on its legitimizing claims of ration-
ality during a crisis. However, while crisis management creates an increased 
need for legitimation by the political system, as a consequence of the crisis, the 
scope for action contracts precisely at those moments in which it needs to be 
drastically expanded to be successful (Ibid.), leading to a legitimation crisis of 
the political system. As the margins of decision-making are smaller during the 
periods of stagnation, political legitimacy is affected by a long economic down-
turn (Vayrynen 1983), and a higher level contestation of the political estab-
lishment can be expected. 
WAVES OF POLITICAL CONTESTATION 
The loss of legitimation is expressed, and can thus be empirically measured, in 
the political behavior of the subjects of the state.7 During a legitimation crisis 
subjects become both more critical and/or apathetic, while the state has the ten-
dency to change its degree of repression (Habermas 1975). Keniston (1968 cit-
ed by Habermas 1975) observed the critical, activist side in student movements, 
revolts by school children, pacifists and women's emancipation. The retreatist, 
apathetic side would be represented by hippies, ‘Jesus-people’, drug subculture, 
phenomena of undermotivation in school, etc. Furthermore, Habermas (1975) 
believed that the legitimation crisis would re-visualize class contradictions, 
which had been concealed by the apolitical market-mechanism. 
Data on the normal (Juglar) business-cycle time intervals show this rela-
tionship between conjuncture and political contestation. For example, a relation 
can be observed between rising unemployment and recession and the occur-
rence of general strikes (Kelly and Hamann 2009; see also Table 5 in the Ap-
pendix). A similar relation can be found between economic downturn and the 
electoral success of right wing extremist formations (De Bromhead et al. 2012). 
Within our theoretical framework of long waves, we could expect the same 
patterns: a downturn of the long wave could appear as a wave of political con-
testation and class struggle. 
From this discussion, this paper assumes the existence of waves in political 
contestation, recurring waves of political action and higher degrees of politi-
cized participation or politicized nonparticipation (retreatism) during the peri-
ods of highest growth in the course of the upswing of a long wave and during 
                                                          
7 For a further discussion see my paper ‘A Sequential Theory of Legitimacy Loss’, written for the 
seminar of Democratic Theory, PhD Course Democracy for the XXIst century (Van Vossole 
2012). 
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the years of negative growth in the course of the downturn. A look at first 
glance on history in Europe confirms their existence. The great depression co-
incided with a general legitimacy loss of establishment parties, the success of 
political movements of the radical left and radical right and a wave of popular 
mobilization. A similar wave of contestation happened at the end of the sixties 
and the nineteen seventies, with a wave of protests, feminist mobilization, civil 
rights movements, terrorist actions of left and rightwing movements.  
Hitherto, in the decades since World War II the most advanced capitalist 
countries have succeeded (the May 1968 events in Paris notwithstanding) in 
keeping class conflict latent in its decisive areas; in extending the business cy-
cle and transforming periodic phases of capital devaluation into a permanent 
inflationary crisis with milder business fluctuations (Habermas 1975) by budg-
etary and monetary expansion. Today, both stimuli and policies reach their lim-
its, both at the monetary (the loose policy was at the origin of the financial cri-
sis) and budgetary levels, as the high sovereign debts become unbearable, 
a fiscal crisis situation developing in almost every country and defaults are 
bringing the financial system in the danger zone. This is expressed in a deeper 
legitimation crisis. 
Today's legitimation crisis could be observed on the activist side in the oc-
cupy-movement, the general strikes sweeping through Europe, the Arab Spring, 
the success of the populist right and populist left in elections and the instability 
of governments. The retreatism could be found in decaying party-membership, 
particularly in government parties, the lower electoral participation, experi-
ments of ‘non-capitalist economies’, etc… 
Conclusion 
This paper defends the case of the existence of long waves in politics. Existing 
main stream political wave theories, in particular that of Samuel Huntington 
(1991), show serious shortcomings. Huntington's observation, that rapid growth 
provokes possible legitimacy problems for regimes, could be retained in certain 
circumstances, but should be complemented with the fact that negative growth 
has even a bigger impact on legitimation and possible change of the political 
institutions (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). 
As an alternative this paper proposed the existence of waves based on le-
gitimation, which would be expressed as waves of political contestation. These 
waves find their driving force in the internal dynamics of the economical long 
wave theories. 
Nevertheless, the long wave-approach should never be regarded in a de-
terministic sense, but as a framework which enables social scientists to engage 
with different dimensions of social sciences in interdisciplinary manner com-
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bining elements of history, economy, sociology and political science to under-
stand and frame current events. It enables us to place the recent economic crisis 
and the political turmoil into a historic perspective. It also gives us a framework 
to look critically at the solutions proposed by policy makers to this reality. 
This paper only established a theoretical hypothesis that should be empir-
ically substantiated. This could be done by a comparative approach of elec-
tion results over the time, a comparison between social movements, as well as 
by the occurrence of general strikes for example. Other parameters are the 
occurrence of terrorism and the behavior of political parties. This paper 
should thus be an invitation for further research and the deepening of the pre-
sented hypothesis. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Kondratieff wave chronology  
Long wave 
number Long wave phase Lates of the beginning Dates of the end 
One 
A: upswing ‘The end of the 1780s 
or beginning of the 
1790s’ 
1810–1817 
B: downswing 1810–1817 1844–1851 
Two A: upswing 1844–1851 1870–1875 B: downswing 1870–1875 1890–1896 
Three A: upswing 1890–1896 1914–1920 B: downswing From 1914 to 1928/29 1939–1950 
Four A: upswing 1939–1950 1968–1974 B: downswing 1968–1974 1984–1991 
Five A: upswing 1984–1991 2008–2010? B: downswing 2008–2010? ? 
Source: Korotayev and Tsirel 2010, Table 1 and 2. 
Table 2. Democratization waves  
Democratization Wave Reverse Wave 
1828–1926 1922–1942 
1943–1962 1958–1975 
1974–1990  
 
Table 3. Long waves in industrial production since 1782 
 Prosperity Recession Depression Recovery 
The first wave 1782–1792 1815–1825 1825–1836 1836–1845 
1792–1802*    
The second wave 1845–1856 1866–1872 1872–1883 1883–1892 
1856–1866    
The third wave 1892–1903 1920–1929 1929–1937 1937–1948 
1903–1913**    
The fourth wave 1948–1957 1966–1973 1973–  
1957–1966    
Note: * War in 1802–1815; ** War in 1913–1920. 
Source: Vayrynen (1983), based on Schumpeter (1939) and Huntington (1991). 
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Table 4. Hobsbawm's historical periods and long wave periodicities 
 Upswing Downswing 
Long Nineteenth Century   
Age of Revolution 1789–1848 First 1793–1814/25 1814/25–48 
Age of Capital 1848–75 Second 1848–73  
Age of Empire 1875–1914  1873–96 
 Third 1896–1914/20  
Short Twentieth Century   
Age of Catastrophe 1914–45  1914/20–48 
The Golden Age 1945–73 Fourth 1948–73  
The Landslide 1973–97/8  1973–98 
Source: Hobsbawm 1994. 
Table 5. Growth and strikes  
  Greece Italy France Spain Belgium Total 
Unemployment Falling 25 13 4 1 1 44 
 Rising 13 3 6 6 6 34 
Price inflation Falling 18 7 5 5 1 36 
 Rising 20 9 5 2 6 42 
GDP growth rate Falling 23 10 8 4 5 50 
 Rising 15 6 2 3 2 28 
Gross nominal 
earnings 
Falling 20 5 5 5 5 40 
 Rising 18 11 5 2 2 38 
Source: Kelly and Hamann 2009. 
